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ABSTRACT 
The Patterns and Prosecutions of Media Leakers 
 
by 
Julia Lipkins 
 
 
Advisor: Karen Miller 
 
 
This paper examines the cases of government employees who are responsible for the disclosure 
of confidential information to the press, known as media leakers. I claim that the government and 
media leaker engage in a series of patterned responses, which leads to both the disclosure of 
information, and prosecution of the leaker. More specifically, I demonstrate how the 
government’s executive branch manages a game of leaks, in which ‘illegitimate’ leakers are 
separated from elite officials who also leak, but are often spared from prosecution because they 
are considered ‘legitimate’ players of the game. Although the boundaries surrounding 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers may appear as fixed and stable, they are actually constantly 
in flux due to momentary social pressures. I demonstrate that regardless of the ‘illegitimate’ 
leaker’s claims to be a whistleblower or serve the public’s interests within the boundaries of the 
law, the executive and in turn the judiciary will respond with aggressive and retaliatory 
measures, particularly if the content of the leak embarrasses the executive or threatens the 
American war project. 
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“…We often view conspiracies of silence as far less threatening than the efforts to end them.” 
      -Eviatar Zerubavel, The Elephant in the Room 
 
“Seven grave and reverend Senators have been assigned to the ridiculous task of trying to find 
out how the secrets of executive sessions leak out. These dignified gentlemen are expected to go 
smelling about and asking questions for the purpose of ascertaining how newspaper reporters get 
at such matters of public interests as transpire though the closed doors of the Senate, when they 
know perfectly well that the only possible source of information, direct or indirect, is the 
Senators themselves. If the matter is to be made is to be made the subject of inquiry, the Senate 
in the secrecy of its star chamber should search the hearts of its own members. The executive 
sessions are a ridiculous heritage of the past anyway, and are so regarded by many Senators, who 
fail to be impressed by the sanctity of their “secret” doings. They are made the more ridiculous 
by the promptness with which anything of consequence that is done becomes known, and the 
climax of absurdity is reached in this solemn inquiry as to how it happens.” 
      -New York Times, Editorial, February 27, 1890 
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Introduction 
This paper examines the cases of government employees who are responsible for the 
disclosure of confidential information to the press, known as media leakers. I claim that the 
government and media leaker engage in a series of patterned responses, which leads to both the 
disclosure of information, and prosecution of the leaker. More specifically, I demonstrate how 
the government’s executive branch manages a game of leaks, in which ‘illegitimate’ leakers are 
separated from elite officials who also leak, but are often spared from prosecution because they 
are considered ‘legitimate’ players of the game. Although the boundaries surrounding 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers may appear as fixed and stable, they are actually constantly 
in flux due to momentary social pressures. I demonstrate that regardless of the ‘illegitimate’ 
leaker’s claims to be a whistleblower or serve the public’s interests within the boundaries of the 
law, the executive and in turn the judiciary will respond with aggressive and retaliatory 
measures, particularly if the content of the leak embarrasses the executive or threatens the 
American war project.  
 This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 offers a brief overview of relevant 
literature related to media leaks. I also provide an in-depth review of David Pozen’s “The Leaky 
Leviathan,” which is a pivotal examination of media leaks and leakers. Pozen dissects “leak 
panic,”1 in which politicians feign outrage over leaks, while they simultaneously leak 
information as part of everyday communication exchanges within the government. Pozen offers 
a comprehensive legal analysis of the game of leaks, and I build upon his work from a 
sociological perspective. 
                                                
1 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 513. 
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 In Chapter 2, I utilize Erving Goffman’s schema of performative roles to illustrate 
relationships between back region actors in the government and the media. I expand Goffman’s 
conception of informers and go-betweens to demonstrate how leakers and members of the media 
rely upon one another to communicate both within government and in front of the public. 
Additionally, I employ Goffman’s descriptions of front and back regions2 to demonstrate how 
leaker-informers curate back region scenes and props, and deliver them to media-go-betweens, 
who frame the content front region publics. In theorizing the leak, I also reexamine Goffman’s 
assessment of shame and embarrassment as byproducts of definitional disruptions.3 I claim that 
these emotional responses are part of the government’s motivations to retaliate against 
‘illegitimate’ leakers. 
The prosecution of Thomas Drake, a former N.S.A. employee and leaker, serves as my 
case study for Chapter 3. In analyzing the Drake case, I propose a template that illustrates how a 
back region government employee evolves into a leaker-informer. Drake was initially motivated 
to act after the Bush Administration portrayed contradictory front and back region “definitions of 
the situation”4 in the wake of 9/11. Leakers like Drake are often thought of as lone wolves,5 but I 
demonstrate that they actually part of a team of dissenters. These groups attempt to voice their 
concerns through ‘proper’ channels, but are often rebuked by their superiors in the government. 
Following the rejection, Drake and other leakers turn to the press to give voice to their concerns. 
I explain how Drake, an ‘illegitimate’ player in the game of leaks, was targeted by both the Bush 
and Obama Administrations, who framed his crime of disclosure as a crime against the sacred 
                                                
2 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 106. 
3 Goffman, 13; Goffman, “Embarrassment and Social Organization.” 
4 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 83. 
5 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 599. 
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body of the American soldier. The Drake case also illuminates the legal and illegal measures that 
administrations will employ if the executive is shamed by the content of the leak, or perceives 
that the leak threatens the American war project. 
 In Chapter 4, I examine the case of Daniel Ellsberg, the famed leaker of the Pentagon 
Papers. I explain how his behavior, and that of the government’s, follows the template of 
patterned responses laid out in Chapter 3. Like Drake, Ellsberg was motivated by the executive’s 
contradictory front and back region “definitions of the situation.”6 Although Ellsberg is often 
remembered as acting alone, he too worked with a group of dissenters who initially sought to 
express their concerns through ‘proper’ and appointed channels. After Ellsberg and his 
‘teammates’ were rebuffed, he sought redress through the media. In Ellsberg’s case, it is evident 
that regardless of his motivations for leaking, he was targeted by the Nixon administration 
because he both shamed the executive and threatened the American war project. 
 In the concluding chapter, I review the cases discussed throughout this paper and briefly 
examine the Trump Administration’s response to media leaks. Additionally, I pose questions 
about the ever-changeable boundaries that surrounding the ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 83. 
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Chapter 1: Review of “The Leaky Leviathan” 
There is a thin but growing body of interdisciplinary literature on media leaks. Legal 
scholars, including Margaret Kwoka,7 Yochai Benkler,8 Mary-Rose Papandrea,9 and Lili Levi10 
have written extensively about leaks in the context of First Amendment Rights. Agnes Ku11 and 
Christopher Bail12 have explored the relationships between media leaks, the public sphere, and 
state secrecy from a sociological perspective. Bail, who draws on cultural sociology, symbolic 
interaction, and ethnomethodology, offers a compelling theory about how civil society actors use 
media leaks to highlight an administration’s contradictory behaviors, and challenge their 
epistemic authority.13 As I am interested in the selective prosecution of media leakers, I have 
found the work of David Pozen, a scholar of constitutional law, most germane to my research. 
For his 2013 article, “The Leaky Leviathan,” Pozen conducted interviews with government 
officials and journalists, and drew on political and legal theories to scrutinize the “dramatic 
disconnect between the ways our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the 
way they condone it in practice.”14 Underneath this disconnect, Pozen discovered an 
“information control regime,”15 which is managed and maintained to benefit members of the 
executive branch and media elites, the primary purveyors and receivers of leaks.16 This review is 
                                                
7 Kwoka, “Leaking and Legitimacy.” 
8 Benkler, “A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth 
Estate.” 
9 Papandrea, “Leaker Traitor Whistblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First Amendment.” 
10 Levi, “Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source Relations.” 
11 Ku, “Boundary Politics in the Public Sphere.” 
12 Bail, "The Public Life of Secrets.” 
13 Bail, 116. 
14 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 513. 
15 Pozen, 607. 
16 Pozen, 529–31, 579–80. 
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not an exhaustive summary of Pozen’s findings, but rather an overview and critique of his 
conclusions that are relevant to my research. 
 
What is a Media Leak? 
In “The Leaky Leviathan,” Pozen restricts his analysis to leaks about national security 
issues. However, his definition of leaks could be applied to disclosures of any theme. Pozen 
describes leaks as: 
(i) a targeted disclosure (ii) by a government insider (employee, former employee, 
contractor) (iii) to a member of the media (iv) of confidential information the divulgence 
of which is generally proscribed by law, policy, or convention (v) outside of any formal 
process (vi) with an expectation of anonymity.17 
  
The motivation for leakers to disclose is an issue explored by Pozen, in addition to Stephen Hess, 
a Nixon staffer and author, and Martin Arnold, a journalist for the New York Times.18 Disclosures 
are often described and classified by leaker’s motivation; for example, there is the leak to “affect 
government policy;” the “self-serving leak” to protect an individual’s reputation; the “angry 
leak” made by a disgruntled employee; and the “threat leak,” employed by the military to induce 
public fear in order to secure their spending budgets.19 Additionally, Arnold describes the “trial 
balloon,” in which government officials will use leaks to “test the waters” for public reactions in 
regards to new policies or slogans.20 Pozen and Hess both note that leaks often fall across 
categories, and that leakers “may have multiple motivations or goals, some of them 
unconscious.”21 
                                                
17 Pozen, 521. 
18 Hess, The Government/Press Connection; Arnold, “The News ‘Leak’: A Washington Necessity.” 
19 Arnold, “The News ‘Leak’: A Washington Necessity.” 
20 Arnold. 
21 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 532. 
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Government officials often respond to media reports that contain leaked information with 
performative episodes of “leak panic.”22 Trump, for example, performs outrage over leaks on 
Twitter; on May 14, 2018, he tweeted “The so-called leaks coming out of the White House are a 
massive over exaggeration put out by the Fake News Media in order to make us look as bad as 
possible. With that being said, leakers are traitors and cowards, and we will find out who they 
are!”23 Despite such fervent claims of wrongdoing, media leaks are in fact a “routine method of 
communication about government.”24 Journalists have noted that leaks of classified or sensitive 
information are regarded as “the coin of [the] business”25 or the “oil in the machine.”26 In March 
2017, during an episode of leak panic concerning James Comey’s testimony before Congress, 
Carl Bernstein tweeted, “I can state w/confidence that many intel members now decrying 'leaks' 
of classified info have themselves 'leaked' classified info knowingly.”27 Pozen explains how 
leaks are simply one method of communication that members of the government use to “push 
information”28 within and across agencies. Leaks and counter-leaks can function as a proxy 
debate, in which officials argue their perspectives on specific issues or policies though the 
confidential information they provide to journalists.29 Pozen writes, “Underneath the surface of 
the stories we read in the newspapers citing anonymous U.S. officials, lies an elaborate 
intragovernmental communicative economy.”30 
                                                
22 Pozen, 513. 
23 Trump, “The So-Called Leaks Coming out of the White House.” 
24 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 528. 
25 Pozen, 531. 
26 Arnold, “The News ‘Leak’: A Washington Necessity.” 
27 Bernstein, “Bernstein Tweet.” 
28 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 578. 
29 Pozen, 578. 
30 Pozen, 578. 
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Who are the Leakers? 
 Leaks are not only a commonplace occurrence, but they are also most often distributed 
by government officials in “leadership positions.”31 Pozen writes, “The ship of the state, one 
often hears, is the only known vessel that leaks from the top - starting, that is, from the White 
House itself.”32 Unlike mid or low-level bureaucrats, who might need physical evidence to gain 
the attraction of reporters and editors at the New York Times, Washington Post, and other elite 
media organizations, senior government officials are a prima facie trusted source.33 Such 
officials, Pozen claims, are unlikely to be accused of leaking a deluge of documents,34 like 
Edward Snowden or Chelsea Manning, as they are already socialized into “Washington power 
culture”35 and have the ear of elite reporters.  
Prior to the Trump Administration, there had only been between 12 and 25 criminal 
prosecutions of leakers in the history of the United States.36 The leaker’s socialization and 
enmeshment in “Washington power culture”37 underlies some of the government’s reluctance to 
prosecute; so often the road to the source of the leak leads back to the upper echelons of 
government.38 The Valerie Plame affair exemplifies why the executive branch often finds 
prosecution of leakers a risky endeavor.39 In the Plame case, a Special Prosecutor charged 
Scooter Libby, the Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, for lying under oath during an F.B.I. 
investigation of a leak relating to the unmasking of Plame, a C.I.A. operative. “Formal leak 
                                                
31 Pozen, 529. 
32 Pozen, 529. 
33 Pozen, 531, 533. 
34 Kwoka, “Leaking and Legitimacy.” 
35 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 543. 
36 Pozen, 534. 
37 Pozen, 543. 
38 Pozen, 570–71. 
39 Pozen, 570. 
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investigations,” Pozen writes, “risk exposing top officials’ efforts to manipulate the secrecy rules 
and marginalize opponents, among other machinations.”40 In order to avoid formal leak 
investigations that implicate powerful government officials, a system of “permissive neglect”41 
towards leakers has been instituted instead. Tepid and ad-hoc regulation42 of leaks not only 
serves to protect high-level political appointees and bureaucrats from legal entanglements, but it 
also facilitates an administration’s ability to anonymously distribute and frame its agendas in the 
press.43  
 
The Leak-Plant Continuum 
The movement of secret or classified information from inside the government to the press 
can take the form of a leak, a plant, or as Pozen explains, a combination of the two, which he 
labels a “pleak.”44 While plants are often “made or directed by the President and his immediate 
advisors.”45 leaks are generally the work of lower-level employees who act without any 
authorization from the administration. Snowden, an NSA subcontractor, and Manning, a soldier, 
are prototypical leakers in Pozen’s scheme. In contrast, “planting,” or authorized disclosing, “is 
not an incidental practice of a few craven officials. It is programmatic, a mode of governance.”46 
Instead of formal, transparent pronouncements the plant affords an administration “wiggle 
room”47 to push its agenda while eluding liability or blame: 
Depending on the context, they [plants] may allow the White House to circumvent or 
cajole the career bureaucracy, to communicate more efficiently with foreign 
                                                
40 Pozen, 571. 
41 Pozen, 546. 
42 Pozen, 616. 
43 Pozen, 559–60. 
44 Pozen, 567. 
45 Pozen, 559. 
46 Pozen, 562. 
47 Pozen, 561 n249. 
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governments, to send signals and warnings to adversaries without formally engaging 
them, to float trial balloons, to respond rapidly to breaking developments, to preserve 
plausible deniability if an initiative is poorly received or an assertion turns out to be false, 
and generally to impart information about executive branch policies without officially 
acknowledging those policies and thereby inviting unwanted forms of accountability or 
constraint.48 
  
A White House official told Pozen that in regards to national security matters, planting is part of 
“every rollout of everything significant we do.”49 However, not all privileged or classified 
information conveyed to the press is a pure-plant or a pure-leak.50 Rather, there’s a spectrum that 
reflects “the degree to which the President has expressly or impliedly blessed a disclosure.”51 
Pleaks, which are in between the “poles” of leaks and plants, have a “quasi-authorized 
character”52 and exist within a “vast, liminal space in which authorization [by the President] may 
be contested.”53 As Pozen describes, pleakers “are not the President’s proxies but they are not 
entirely unfaithful agents either.”54   
The absence of clear administrative guidelines surrounding disclosures, in addition to 
“ambiguous” authorization for specific disclosures, serves not only to insulate pleakers from 
legal liability, but also socializes them to perceive the ‘lines’ surrounding content that is 
‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ to disclose.55 Phillip Carter, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Detainee Policy, told Pozen that “part of the trust instilled in political appointees 
is that they have the judgment to talk about what’s appropriate and not talk about what’s 
                                                
48 Pozen, 559–60. 
49 Pozen, 562. 
50 Pozen, 568–69. 
51 Pozen, 567. 
52 Pozen, 567. 
53 Pozen, 568. 
54 Pozen, 570. 
55 Pozen, 570, 619. 
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inappropriate.”56 The system of permissive neglect socializes “institutional insiders”57 to develop 
this “judgment” through informal sanctions58 which are meted out by higher-ranked insiders and 
peers, rather than through formal legal prosecution. Pleakers help to maintain the “legal and 
bureaucratic fog”59 surrounding leaks, which Pozen explains, “is not a design defect but a critical 
feature of the executive’s information control regime... Leakiness preserves the President’s 
plausible deniability as to his role in the disclosure, if not in the underlying policy as well.”60   
 
Conclusion 
“The Leaky Leviathan” methodically demonstrates how leaks are a standard, everyday 
method of communication used by government officials and members of the media. Pozen’s 
insight about pleaks supports his detailed legal analysis about how the executive wields power 
through a purposefully leaky “information control regime.”61 Although Pozen’s study is astute 
and extremely valuable, it does not offer a sociological analysis on the selective and retaliatory 
prosecution of media leakers. In the coming chapters, I build upon Pozen’s framework and use a 
sociological lens to examine the functions and patterns of leaks. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
56 Pozen, 619–20. 
57 Pozen, 542. 
58 Pozen, 586. 
59 Pozen, 607. 
60 Pozen, 607, 564. 
61 Pozen, 607. 
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Chapter 2: A Sociological Approach to the Interpretation of Media Leaks 
Bail writes that Erving Goffman’s “sociology reminds us that the power of the state is 
deeply dependent on their reputation before the public.”62 Goffman employs dramaturgical terms 
and principles to explain how individuals and groups formulate and perform identities through 
speech, gestures, behavior, and other modes of interactive expressions.63 While Bail and I both 
draw from Goffman’s theories related to reputation management, Bail focuses on Goffman’s 
work on framing,64 and in this chapter, I expand upon Goffman’s concept of “information 
games”65 as described in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. For Goffman, the 
“communication process” is a “kind of information game – a potentially infinite cycle of 
concealment, discovery, false revelation, and rediscovery.”66 Leaks are a type of communication 
process that is performed by people in specific roles within the government and press. In order to 
theorize the use of leaks, I employ Goffman’s classifications of different performative roles to 
reveal the individuals and groups who enact cyclical information games through the curation and 
diffusion of media leaks. 
 
 
Information Games     
 
Pozen, along with other legal scholars67 and journalists,68 have referred to the “game of 
leaks”69 in their examinations of unauthorized national security disclosures. Such a term is 
                                                
62 Bail, “The Public Life of Secrets,” 102. 
63 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 209–37. 
64 Bail, “The Public Life of Secrets," 103. 
65 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 8. 
66 Goffman, 8. 
67 Papandrea, “Leaker Traitor Whistblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First Amendment,” 479. 
68 Hoyt, “What Happened to Skepticism?”; Marcotte, “Trump’s Game of Leaks: Is He Playing The New 
York Times the Same Way the Russians Did?” 
69 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 530. 
    13 
reminiscent of Goffman’s “information games,”70 which occur on stages separated into “front” 
and “back regions.”71 Official, formal performances occur in the front region, while off-the-
record performances transpire in back region, “where the suppressed facts make an 
appearance.”72 It is in the back region where actors “step out of character” and contradict their 
front region personas.73 The “illusions and impressions”74 maintained in the front region are in 
fact crafted in the back region.  
The game of leaks (which includes pleaks and plants) 75 is part of a larger back region 
information game that is played between elite members of the media and government insiders.  
In Goffmanian terms, a media leak is a scene or prop from the back region that has been 
transposed (most often intentionally) to the front region. For example, an unedited video clip of 
Donald Trump making crude remarks was leaked to the press about a month before the 2016 
presidential election.76 In response to the leak, Trump said, “This was locker-room banter, a 
private conversation that took place many years ago. Bill Clinton has said far worse to me on the 
golf course — not even close. I apologize if anyone was offended.”77 The leaked video of 
Trump’s “locker-room banter” is a back region performance brought to the fore with the 
intention of directing the attention of front region publics. Leaks provide a momentary window 
for audience members to intrude upon and reframe the everyday, back region performances of 
governance, media production, and the connective spaces between the two. 
 
                                                
70 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 8. 
71 Goffman, 106. 
72 Goffman, 112. 
73 Goffman, 112, 128. 
74 Goffman, 112. 
75 Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information,” 616. 
76 Fahrenthold, “Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation about Women in 2005.” 
77 Fahrenthold. 
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Leakers as Informers 
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman describes a variety of roles that 
people inhabit in their daily existence. He identifies fundamental roles (performers, audiences, 
and outsiders), in addition to “discrepant roles.”78 An “informer” is one such discrepant role, as 
the individual “pretends to the performers to be a member of their team, is allowed to come 
backstage and to acquire destructive information, and then openly or secretly sells out the show 
to the audience.”79 Goffman continues: 
If it appears that the individual first joined the team in a sincere way and not with the 
premeditated plan of disclosing its secrets, we sometimes call him a traitor, turncoat, or 
quitter, especially if he is the sort of person who ought to have made a decent teammate. 
The individual who all along has meant to inform on the team, and originally joins only 
for this purpose is sometimes called a spy. It has frequently been noted, of course, that 
informers, whether traitors or spies, are often in an excellent position to play a double 
game, selling out the secrets of those who buy secrets from them.80  
  
I employ Goffman’s schema to identify leakers and whistleblowers, regardless of their 
motivations for disclosing, as variations of Goffman’s informers. Leaker-informers do not begin 
their government service with the intention of spying on the teammates, but they do play a 
“double game,”81 as they are permitted to witness and participate in back region performances, 
and then ‘sell out the show,’82 not directly to the audience, but to the press. One well-known 
example a leaker-informer is Mark Felt, more commonly known as Deepthroat. As Associate 
Director at the FBI, he played an extensive double-game by providing information on the 
Watergate break-in to journalist Carl Bernstein, all the while performing outrage and disgust 
over the Washington Post’s reporting before his colleagues and superiors in the back region. 83  
                                                
78 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 145. 
79 Goffman, 145. 
80 Goffman, 145–46. 
81 Goffman, 145–46. 
82 Goffman, 145. 
83 Holland, Leak, 65. 
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In Leak: Why Mark Felt Became Deep Throat, author Max Holland writes that “Felt was a cool 
customer, and often able to turn his dual identity as the leaker and recipient of complaints [about 
the leaks] to his advantage.”84 Nixon expressed constant confusion and rage at the Watergate 
leaks, which “kept the White house off balance and uncertain about its own judgements.” As a 
leaker-informer, Felt ‘sold out the show’85 with curated scenes leaked to reporters, and 
maintained his cover as a dutiful employee and loyal to Nixon. 
 
The Press as Go-Betweens 
Leaker-informers rely on the press to usher scenes and props from the back region to 
front region publics. In the game of leaks, the press bears a resemblance to the discrepant role of 
“go-betweens.”86 Goffman writes, “The go-between learns the secrets of each side and gives 
each side the true impression that he will keep its secrets; but he tends to give each side the false 
impression that he is more loyal to it than to the other.”87 Members of the media can claim 
fidelity to publics, but they must also maintain a loyalty to their sources - leaker-informers - who 
provide them with the scenes and props that populate their stories.  
Although presidential administrations and the press often act as adversaries in the front 
region, back region performances have a less antagonistic tone. “The hostility between Trump’s 
White House and the press may be unusually acute,” reads a May 2017 Politico Magazine 
article, “but it is not interrupting any decades-long streak of bonhomie.”88 A prime example of 
this back region bonhomie can be found in the relationship between Trump and Jeff Zucker, 
                                                
84 Holland, 64–65. 
85 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 145. 
86 Goffman, 149. 
87 Goffman, 149. 
88 Schreckinger and Gold, “Trump’s Fake War on the Fake News.” 
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president of CNN. Zucker was the executive at NBC who had approved “The Apprentice” for 
prime time. Trump has referred to Zucker as his “personal booker,” i.e. a mid-level television 
producer who arranges interviews.89 In an April 2017 New York Times article, Jonathan Mahler 
labeled Zucker and Trump as engaged in a “symbiotic relationship.” Mahler described how in a 
meeting with members of the press, Trump berated CNN, but Zucker described it as part of game 
between friends. “He was attacking CNN, but in a little more of a playful way, because he knew 
me…He was being an ass but in a playful way,”90 said Zucker. When the formal, front region 
meeting was completed, Trump and Zucker could revert to their back region bonhomie.  
“He was incredibly chummy with me, incredibly friendly…It was the old Donald-and-
Jeff relationship — the relationship of two people who have known each other for 15 
years, who had a long relationship, who always had a cordial relationship. And by the 
way, the photographer took several photos of me and Donald together.”91  
Despite blustering, front-region performances of leak panic,92 leaker-informers and media-go-
betweens maintain chummy, cordial relationships as elites who help to maintain an ongoing 
game of leaks within the executive’s larger “information control regime.”93  
 
 
Back Region Teammates and Definitional Disruptions 
 
Leaker-informers and media-go-betweens could be described as provisional teammates in 
the back region performances of both governance and media production. Goffman describes a 
teammate as “someone whose dramaturgical co-operation [...] is dependent upon in fostering a 
given definition of the situation.”94 Leaker-informers surreptitiously refuse dramaturgical co-
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operation with their original, government teammates; they provide the media with scenes and 
props from the back region that can be used to undermine the government’s front region 
“definition of the situation.”95 The “definition of the situation”96 is not only important for 
cultivating back region cohesion amongst teammates,97 but also for maintaining a consistent, 
“projected definition”98 in the front region. This projected definition has “distinctive moral 
character,”99 writes Goffman: 
Society is organized on the principle that any individual who possesses certain social 
characteristics has a moral right to expect that others will value and treat him in 
correspondingly appropriate way…When an individual projects a definition of the 
situation and thereby makes an implicit or explicit claim to be a person of a particular 
kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon the others, obliging them to value and 
treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect…The others find, 
then, that the individual has informed them as to what is and as to what they ought to see 
as the “is.”100  
 
Back region performances tarnish the projected front region definitions and moral demands that 
politicians and their teams have worked to foster.101 Leaker-informers are perceived by their 
original teammates as grave, internal threats precisely because they possess and transfer evidence 
that undermines government’s claim to be what it is. In order to avoid such definitional 
disruptions, back region performers engage in “preventative practices” as precaution against 
embarrassments.102 During episodes of leak panic,103 back region actors employ aggressive 
methods to halt ongoing threats to definitional disruptions, in addition to preemptive measures to 
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ward off future attempts. For example, Nixon established the infamous plumbers, who were 
tasked with ‘plugging leaks’ from within his Administration.104 Reagan attempted to institute 
broad usage of polygraph tests among government officials, and also place FBI agents on-call to 
investigate leaks as they appeared.105 Obama turned to the legal system to prevent leaks; he 
prosecuted more whistleblower and leak cases than both Bush administrations and Regan .106 
Although Obama claimed to support increased transparency in government, his aggressive 
prosecution of leakers demonstrates the sensitives of the executive to perceived threats to their 
“information control regime.”107 For performers who endeavor to support dissent, or sow the 
public’s doubt in existing power dynamics, leaks can serve as the instance and evidence of 
definitional disruptions.108 Leaks can validate feelings of dissonance among front region 
audiences, as they are proof of politicians’ contradictory front and back region identities, and 
thus breaches of trust.109 
 
Outsiders and Shame 
Although leakers, whistleblowers, and hackers may claim differing motivations, their 
actions have a unifying structural thread: the disclosure of information locates the public to the 
role of an outside intruder.110 When a scene or prop is leaked to the front region, the public is 
given a momentary glimpse at the quotidian performances of the back region. Goffman writes, 
“When an outsider accidentally enters a region in which a performance is being given, or when a 
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member of the audience inadvertently enters the backstage, the intruder is likely to catch those 
present flagrante delicto.”111 In Goffman’s scenario, the intrusion is accidental, and for public 
audiences, the leak may feel unintentional or unplanned. However, the media leak is most often 
an intentional act, which deliberately portrays back region actors in flagrante delicto. This 
disclosure, or reveal, can cause “problems in impression management,”112 and subsequent 
feelings of embarrassment, shame, and discomfort for all involved. In his essay, “Embarrassment 
and Social Organization,” Goffman writes, “…Occasions of embarrassment arise when the self 
projected is somehow confronted with another self which, through valid in other contexts, cannot 
be here sustained in harmony with the first.113 The leak, which desegregates front and back 
region audiences, can function as a shaming action, and remind or inform publics that much of 
the business of governing occurs behind closed doors where elected officials perform out of 
character. The Access Hollywood leak, for example, depicts a back region performance that is in 
conflict with the pre-Trump era, normative role of president. It is common, though not certain, 
that back region actors will exhibit regret following the episode, as Billy Bush had said in his 
apology, said, “I’m embarrassed and ashamed.”114 
 
 
Other Discrepant Leakers  
During the 2012 presidential campaign, a bartender covertly filmed Mitt Romney at a 
campaign event with republican donors, each of whom paid $50,000 to attend.115 The bartender, 
in this scenario, represents another discrepant role, known as the “non-person,” who is neither 
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audience member nor actor, and is described by Goffman as “someone who isn’t there.”116 Non-
persons possess back region access, but they are not members of the elite. At the campaign 
event, the bartender filmed Romney giving a speech, where he said, “There are 47 percent who 
are with him [Obama]…who are dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims, 
who believe the government has a responsibility to care for them …My job is not to worry about 
those people.117 Romney did not immediately disown or apologize for his comments. Rather, 
only after the Obama campaign used the leaked video in multiple ads, which affected Romney’s 
poll numbers, did Romney exhibit remorse.119 In this scenario, the leak was used as a prop in a 
performance to delegitimize the opposing team and direct the attention of the front region 
publics. Romney and Billy Bush’s performances of shame and remorse following the leak are 
attempts to then reclaim the public’s attention and repair definitional disruptions. 
            Similar to the discrepant role of non-person, “service specialists”120 also have back region 
access, but are without organic ties to the team. “Service specialists,” writes Goffman, “are like 
members of the team in that they learn the secrets of the show and obtain a backstage view of it. 
Unlike members of the team, however, the specialist does not share the risk, the guilt, and the 
satisfaction of presenting before an audience the show to which he has contributed.121 In contrast 
to leaker-informers who are socialized into the “Washington power culture,”122 the service 
specialist is subjected to a more stringent and formal versions of “discretion.”123 Edward 
Snowden, a contractor with Booz Allen Hamilton, is an example of a service specialists turned 
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leaker-informer. The role of the service specialist is reminiscent of Simmel’s stranger; someone 
who embodies both nearness and remoteness, and “like the poor and like sundry ‘inner enemies’ 
is an element of the group itself.”124 Again, regardless Snowden’s claims of a moral obligation to 
disclose classified information as a whistleblower, it was his is structural position that gave him 
the ability to perform as leaker-informers. 
 
Conclusion 
 In theorizing the game of leaks, I employ Goffman’s schema of performative roles to 
illustrate relationships between back region actors in the government and the media. Goffman’s 
conception of front and back regions helps clarify how leaks are curated by leaker-informers and 
intentionally delivered to media-go-betweens, who frame and amplify the leak for publics. 
Additionally, as we will see in the coming chapters, I revisit Goffman’s identification of 
embarrassment and shame as a byproduct of “problems in impression management”125 and how 
these emotions function in the government’s retaliation against leakers. 
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Chapter 3: Case Study of Thomas Drake 
The evolution of a back region government employee to a leaker-informer on trial for 
espionage follows a specific plotline of events. This chapter uses the case of Thomas Drake, an 
N.S.A. employee who became a leaker-informer following 9/11, to illustrate structural patterns 
evident in the environment and actions of leaker-informers, and their subsequent prosecutions 
brought by the government. The patterned behavior available in the Drake case provide a 
template for how the leaker-informer and government react to one another.  
As we will see in the Drake case, the template begins with a contradiction in the 
government’s front and back region “definitions of the situation.”126 A back region actor, 
disturbed by the contradiction, looks for coworkers who share her distress or unease. These 
colleagues form a new ‘team’ and attempt to address their concerns through ‘proper channels.’ 
When they are rebuffed, back region actor becomes a leaker-informer and seeks redress through 
the media. The media publicizes the actor’s concerns, which in turn shames the government. As 
the leaker-informer is not a ‘legitimate’127 player in the game of leaks, the government retaliates 
through legal and illegal means, and conflates the leaker-informer’s disclosures with espionage. 
The Drake case demonstrates that if the content of the leak, and ‘bad press’ surrounding the 
disclosure, embarrasses the government or potentially hinders the American war project, the 
‘illegitimate’ leaker-informer will be targeted for prosecution.  
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Back Region Realignments 
Prior to 9/11, the N.S.A.’s technological capabilities had failed to adapt to the speedy 
transformations of internet-based communications.128 To address some of the organization’s 
technological flaws, the Agency turned to Thomas Drake, a veteran of the Air Force and Navy, 
who was regarded as an expert in “military crypto-electronics.”129 Drake had already worked 
with the N.S.A. as a software contractor from 1989 to 2001. He was eventually hired as a full-
time employee, working under Maureen Baginiski, head of the N.S.A.’s Signals Intelligence 
Directorate. His first day on the job was September 11th, 2001.130  
            While working as a contractor, Drake had met Bill Binney, a longtime N.S.A. employee 
and seasoned technical director. Binney believed that the N.S.A.’s most pressing challenge was 
“data overload.”131 The agency’s model of intelligence collection had been to amass digital 
information and then send it to the appropriate parties for analysis. Binney and his team offered 
an inverse model of collection; their program, a computer application known as ThinThread, 
“processed information as it was collected—discarding useless information on the spot and 
avoiding the overload problem that plagued centralized systems.”132 ThinThread worked “nearly 
perfectly” during test runs.133 However, the program initially failed to distinguish domestic from 
foreign communications, which meant that Americans could be monitored without a warrant. 
Binney fixed this issue by adding an “anonymizing feature,” which allowed Americans’ 
communications to be encrypted until a warrant was obtained by the investigating agency.134 
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            Despite the successful tests of ThinThread prior to 9/11, N.S.A. Director Michael Hayden 
pivoted away from the project; attorneys at the N.S.A. had warned that the program could 
potentially violate Americans’ constitutional rights.135 Hayden favored a competing 
communications surveillance program, known as Trailblazer, and hired private defense 
contractors to usher it into existence. According to author Matthew Aid, “The resistance to 
ThinThread was just standard bureaucratic politics. ThinThread was small, cost-effective, easy to 
understand, and protected the identity of Americans. But it wasn’t what the higher-ups wanted. 
They wanted a big machine that could make Martinis, too.”136  
            Trailblazer was not fully operational when 9/11 occurred.137 Following the attacks, Drake 
believed ThinThread “could be put into the fight.”138 He wrote a classified brief on the program 
and gave it Baginiski, but she rebuffed his efforts. Drake said Baginski “wouldn’t respond 
electronically. She just wrote in a black felt marker, ‘They’ve found a different solution.’”139 In 
October 2001, Drake, Binney, and others inside the N.S.A. began hearing rumors about the 
Agency engaging in warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. Binney, disturbed 
by the rumors, believed that the N.S.A. was using a “bastardized version”140 of ThinThread 
without the anonymizing features. Drake had also observed that “strange things were happening 
[at the Agency]. Equipment was being moved. People were coming to me and saying, ‘We’re 
now targeting our own country!...I was concerned that is was illegal, and none of it was 
necessary...It wasn’t just that the breaks came off after 9/11 - we were in a whole different 
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vehicle.”141 Drake expressed his concerns about the rumors to Baginiski, who told him to contact 
the N.S.A.’s general counsel if he wanted to pursue the matter. Drake claims he spoke with Vito 
Potenza, the Agency’s deputy general counsel, who allegedly said, “Don’t worry about it. We’re 
the executive agent for the White House. It’s all been scrubbed. It’s legal...It’s none of your 
business.”142 Binney and his wife, who also worked at the N.S.A., along with colleagues Ed 
Loomis and J. Kirk Wiebe, all retired from the agency on October 31, 2001. Binney said, “I 
couldn’t be an accessory to subverting the constitution.”143 
            Diane Roark, a long-time employee of the House Intelligence Committee, who had been 
in contact with Binney, Wiebe, and Drake, had also heard accounts of the N.S.A.’s post-9/11 
pivot to warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. She claims to have expressed 
her concerns about the illegality of the program to Representatives Porter Goss and Nancy 
Pelosi, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and David Addington, an advisor to Vice President 
Dick Cheney, who was actually a supporter of the program. Roark’s concerns, like Drake’s, were 
ignored by her superiors. “This was such a Catch-22...There was no one to go to,” she said.144 
            The events of 9/11 had disrupted front and back region “definitions of the situation”145 
for N.S.A. employees. As the Bush Administration attempted to craft new front region 
“definitions,” they also enacted clandestine shifts in back region policies through the 
‘bastardization’ of ThinThread. These shifts in turn restructured allegiances amongst back region 
teammates at the N.S.A. Prior to 9/11, Hayden had been wary of surveillance programs that were 
“too invasive of Americans’ privacy;”146 afterwards, he embraced an approach that intentionally 
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and systematically breached Americans’ privacy. The retirement of Binney and other 
government employees was an act of noncompliance; they openly refused to cooperate as 
teammates in performances of new “definitions of the situation.”147 
            Drake, in contrast to his retired colleagues, surreptitiously, rather than blatantly, refused 
dramaturgical cooperation with his back region teammates. Drake decided to serve as a leaker-
informer; he gave top-secret documents about the N.S.A.’s pre-9/11 intelligence failures to 
Roark and others in Congress. Although he was effectively leaking from one back region to 
another, he was still in violation of N.S.A. rules, which forbade interagency communications 
without approval.148 Drake was playing a ‘double game’ by participating in back region 
performances of new “definition of the situations,”149 all the while ‘selling out the show’150 to 
Congressional staffers. 
            In September 2002, Binney, Wiebe, Loomis, and Roark filed a confidential complaint 
with the Office of the Inspector General (IG) at the N.S.A. The group was rebuffed, so they filed 
yet another confidential complaint with the IG at the Department of Defense.151 The complaint 
was not focused on the warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications, but rather the 
benefits of the original ThinThread program and the failures of Trailblazer.152 Drake was not a 
signatory to the complaint, as he was still employed at the N.S.A., but served as a leaker-
informer by providing the group with “documents aimed at proving waste, fraud, and abuse” 
relating to Trailblazer.153 By collaborating on the IG complaint, Drake, Binney, Wiebe, Loomis, 
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and Roark, acted as new group of ‘teammates,’ who sought to establish another “definition of the 
situation.”154 This new team’s definition framed the government’s implementation of Trailblazer 
as an egregious error; in their narrative, if a ‘clean’ version of ThinThread with the anonymizing 
feature had been selected instead, 9/11 could have been prevented.155  
 
Reassigning Shame 
The rumors of domestic surveillance that Drake and his ‘teammates’ had heard in 2001 
was ushered into the view of front region publics in December 2005. James Risen and Eric 
Lichtblau, reporters for the New York Times, wrote an article titled, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on 
Callers Without Courts.”156 Risen and Lichtblau had been leaked information about the N.S.A.’s 
post-9/11 warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. The Times had actually 
known about the surveillance program for more than a year prior to the 2005 article but refrained 
from publishing because President Bush had intimated to the paper’s editors that “you’ll have 
blood on your hands.”157 Following the release of Risen and Lichtblau’s article, Bush said the 
leak to the Times was “a shameful act” and ordered the Justice Department to investigate.158 
            The Times leak brought the shifts in N.S.A.’s back region policies to front region publics. 
The leak, which functioned as a shaming action against the government, exposed the 
contradictions of the Bush Administration’s front and back region performances. Instead of 
claiming responsibility for the discrepancies, Bush attempted to redirect the shame onto the 
media-go-betweens and the unknown leaker-informer. Bush’s direction to the Justice 
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Department to find and prosecute the leaker was an effort to prevent any further definitional 
disruptions of his Administration’s front region performances.  
            Additionally, the suggestion that the Times will have ‘blood on its hands’ for publishing 
the leak demonstrates how the government attempts to frame leaks as crimes against the body of 
the American soldier, rather than a crime of information disclosure. Bush’s statement directs the 
attention of front region actors to an imagined harm against a physical body, like a “soldier in the 
field.”159 In the post-9/11 wars, Bush framed the American soldier in the vein of the World War 
II liberators, who were “moral protagonist[s]” and “heroic carriers of the good.”160 In claiming 
that the Times will have ‘blood on its hands,’ Bush is shifting blame for harm to the sacred body 
of the American soldier onto media-go-betweens and leaker-informers.  
            In light of the Times story, Congress held hearings about the extent of the N.S.A.’s post-
9/11 warrantless surveillance of Americans’ communications. The Bush Administration justified 
their shift in policy by claiming “that the traditional method of getting warrants was too slow for 
the urgent threats posed by international terrorism.”161 Drake was dismayed by the Bush 
Administration’s response; he said, “They were lying through their teeth. They had chose to go 
an illegal route, and it wasn’t because they had no other choice...I was faced with a crisis of 
conscience. What do I do—remain silent, and complicit, or go to the press?”162  
            In Drake’s deliberation, we see evidence of his experience as what DeGloma calls, an 
“awakening.”163  DeGloma explains that “individuals tell awakening stories to explain a radical 
transformation of consciousness, a fundamental change in their perception of their lives and their 
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orientation to the world around them.”164 Drake’s “crisis of conscience” reveals how he 
differentiated his past self, one tainted by silence and complicity, from a present self that is 
oriented towards revealing the ‘truth’ about the Bush Administration’s policy shift.165  Although 
Drake had already acted as a leaker-informer, and made efforts to surreptitiously separate 
himself from his colleagues who were complying with the post- 9/11 “definition of the 
situation,”166 his decision to seek redress through the press became the “transformative 
experience”167 that directed the trajectory of his future actions.  
Following the Administration’s response to the congressional hearings, Drake asked 
Roark to help him get in touch with Siobhan Gorman, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun, who had 
written extensively about national security issues. Roark reminded Drake about the extreme 
repercussions the N.S.A. inflicts against those who “embarrass” the organization.168 At first, 
Drake contacted Gorman through a secure email account and sent her anonymous tips, but he 
eventually identified himself and met her in person to discuss his concerns.169 From January 
2006 to November 2007, Gorman wrote170 a series of articles about the N.S.A., including a 
feature about management problems171 with Trailblazer. 
            There was disagreement in the intelligence community as to whether or not Drake 
provided classified information to Gorman.172 Author Matthew Aid said the articles were 
“embarrassing to N.S.A. management, but embarrassment to the U.S. government is not a 
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criminal offense in this country.”173 Contrary to Aid’s claims, embarrassment and shame as 
products of definitional disruptions can in fact incite the government to frame leaks as crimes, in 
particular as offenses against the body of the American soldier and the body of the state.  
 
Proper Channels and Targets 
The Bush Administration assembled a group of twenty-five federal agents and five 
prosecutors to find the Times leaker. The team was pursuing “some two hundred possible 
targets,” but had not yet discovered the source of the disclosure to the Times.174 When Gorman’s 
article series on the N.S.A. appeared in the Sun, some agents speculated that the Sun and Times’ 
reporters had the same source.175 Although a link between the Sun and the Times sources was 
never found, the F.B.I. redirected their prosecutorial focus to critics of Trailblazer. An 
intelligence expert said, “It’s sad. I think they were aiming at the Times leak and found this 
[leaks to Gorman] instead.”176   
Armed F.B.I. agents raided the homes of Roark, Binney and Wiebe on July 26, 2007.177 
The agents confiscated computers, documents, and demanded information about the Times 
leaker. Binney claims that agents encouraged him to name Roark as Times leaker. In turn, Roark 
says that the agents wanted her to pin the leak on Drake. About four months after the July raids, 
the F.B.I. descended on Drake’s home. At first, Drake attempted to cooperate; he spoke without 
a lawyer and provided details about the failures of Trailblazer. However, Drake soon learned that 
                                                
173 Mayer. 
174 Mayer. 
175 Mayer. 
176 Mayer. 
177 Mayer. 
    31 
the agents were only interested the Times leak,178 as it had had deeply shamed the Bush 
Administration and disrupted their clandestine expansion of surveillance powers. 
Wiebe said the raids on the teams’ homes were “retribution for our filing the Inspector 
General complaint.”179 Jesselyn Radack, an attorney at the Government Accountability Project 
and one of Drake’s lawyers, agreed: “It’s the most severe form of whistleblower retaliation I 
have ever seen.”180 Government employees are encouraged to voice their dissent through 
confidential and ‘proper’ channels, such as complaints to the IG.181 However, as is evident in the 
Drake case, ‘proper’ methods of communication are not necessarily confidential, nor are they 
structured to protect dissenters. Sanctioned methods of communication can serve to mark targets 
and silence employees.182 Additionally, these ‘proper’ channels also reinforce boundaries 
surrounding ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’183 players in the game of leaks.184 ‘Proper’ channels 
and complaints to the IG are not intended for high-ranking officials, or ‘legitimate’185 players, 
who can deliver their opinions or concerns directly to elite media outlets. Rather, ‘proper’ 
channels are designed for lower and mid-level employees, or ‘illegitimate’ players, who lack 
pathways to redress in both front and back regions.  
In June 2010, some three years after the F.B.I. raids and two years into the Obama 
Administration, Drake was charged with violating the Espionage Act, in addition to obstructing 
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justice, and lying to the F.B.I.186 However, the charges against Drake did not stem from his leaks 
to Gorman, but rather documents and emails that the F.B.I. retrieved during the raid on his home. 
The documents in question included a schedule of meetings that was categorized as 
“unclassified/ for official use only,” though the government claimed that the schedule “should 
have been classified, and Drake should have known this.”187 James Wyda, Drake’s lawyer, said 
that his client had unintentionally retained the “benign” documents, and his actions did not 
warrant such serious charges.188 However, William Welch, the prosecutor, painted a more dire 
picture during a pre-trial hearing: 
...This not an issue of benign documents, and it’s not an issue of insignificant documents. 
It’s very easy, for example, to talk about satellite photographs, and it’s easy to talk about 
battleships and military troop movements as national defense information, but this case is 
different because N.S.A. does not have battleships and they don’t have satellite 
photographs, and they don’t have troops, but, rather, what they do is they collect 
intelligence for the soldier in the field. So, when individuals go out and they harm that 
ability, our intelligence goes dark, and our soldier in the field gets harmed.189  
 
Welch reframes Drake’s alleged crime of information retention (no longer information 
disclosure) as a crime that could harm “our soldier in the field.”190 Similar to Bush’s claim that 
the Times would have ‘blood on its hands,’ Welch asserts that Drake’s actions could cause direct 
harm to the soldier’s body. The leaker-informer is thus guilty of endangering the sacred 
American soldier and the state’s position as the “moral protagonist.”191   
John Crane, a former Assistant Inspector General at Department of Defense, claims that 
the government’s retaliation against Drake was not only intentional, but also accomplished 
through illegal means. Crane states that following the Times’ reports about warrantless 
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surveillance, a high-level official at the IG provided the F.B.I. with the names of Drake and his 
‘teammates’ directly from their IG report about Trailblazer.192 Additionally, when Drake’s 
lawyer requested documents from the IG relating to his case, officials said they couldn’t provide 
any information because clerical staff had “fucked up” and  “shredded the documents in a 
supposedly routine purge of the IG’s vast stores of confidential material.”193 Crane, shocked by 
the news that materials had been destroyed, was told by his superiors that he should be a “team 
player.”194 Crane refused to be a “team player” and rejected dramaturgical cooperation in back 
region performances surrounding the Drake case; he became a whistleblower and accused his 
superiors at the IG of aiding the illegal and retaliatory actions against Drake.195 It is evident in 
Crane’s allegations that back region government officials had to go to extraordinary and illegal 
measures to support their illusory claims that Drake was a threat to national security and a 
criminal guilty of espionage. 
A little more than a year after Drake was charged, the government offered him a deal.196 
In exchange for pleading guilty to one misdemeanor charge of “exceeding his authorized access 
to government computers,”197 the government dropped the original ten felony charges, including 
the alleged violation of the Espionage Act. Steven Aftergood, a transparency advocate at the 
Federation of American Scientists, said “The outcome pales in comparison to the opening 
thunder of the indictment and that shows that the government miscalculated both the severity of 
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the offense and the quality of its own evidence.”198 Drake, along with his ‘teammates,’ who were 
not charged, did not serve any time in jail.  
Officials in Obama’s Justice Department described the prosecutions of leakers, like 
Drake, as an imperative.199 Lanny Breuer, Obama’s head of the criminal division at the Justice 
Department said, “You don’t get to break the law and disclose classified information just 
because you want to...Politics should play no role in it [the prosecution] whatsoever.” “Politics,” 
in terms of party affiliation, may play a minor role in determining who is prosecuted for leaking 
and/or retaining classified documents, and who is not. A more primary factor in targeting and 
prosecuting offenders is determining whether or not the accused is considered a ‘legitimate’ or 
‘illegitimate’200 player in the game of leaks. ‘Legitimate’ players (such as John Deutch, C.I.A. 
Director under Clinton, and Alberto Gonzales, the Attorney General under Bush), who are 
accused of retaining classified documents,201 often receive token admonishments. In contrast, 
Drake, an ‘illegitimate’ player, was treated as a traitor, charged under the Espionage Act, and 
blamed for causing potential harm to ‘soldiers in the field.’ Whether or not the back region 
actor(s) retained classified documents by accident, or on purpose with the goal of acting as a 
leaker or whistleblower, the intention for retention is of little consequence. Rather, as is evident 
in the Drake case, a back region actor will become a target for prosecution if she is an 
‘illegitimate’202 player in the game of leaks, and her actions lead to the shaming of government 
officials or policies in the front region. 
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Conclusion 
The Drake case serves as a template for how a back region government employee can 
evolve into a leaker-informer. The Bush Administration’s contradictory front and back region 
“definitions of the situation”203 were the primary instigations for Drake to find new ‘teammates’ 
and eventually turn to the media to find redress for his concerns. As Drake was not a 
‘legitimate’204 player in the game of leaks, he was targeted, prosecuted for espionage, and 
accused with causing potential harm to the bodies of ‘soldiers in the field.’ The Drake case 
demonstrates that if the executive is shamed by the content of the leaked material, or the 
American war project is jeopardized, the leaker will face aggressive and illegal retaliation from 
the government.    
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Chapter 4: Case Study of Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers 
 There’s a scene in the documentary, The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel 
Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers, where Ellsberg describes a flight he took in October 1966 
with Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense. McNamara asks Ellsberg if the U.S. position 
in Vietnam had improved over the previous year with the addition of 100,000 troops. Ellsberg 
replies that the situation is “the same.” McNamara concludes that if the situation is the same, 
then it’s actually worse because the additional troops failed to improve the situation. When the 
plane lands at Andrews Air Force Base, McNamara tells a group of reporters that “military 
progress in the past twelve months has exceeded our expectations.” Ellsberg says, “I was 
thinking, I hope I’m never in a job where I have to lie like that.”205  
 As is evident in this episode, the Johnson and Nixon Administration’s contradictory front 
and back region performances of the Vietnam War came to play a significant role in the story of 
Daniel Ellsberg and the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers. This chapter uses the template of 
events established in Chapter 3 to examine the executive’s patterned responses to Ellsberg as an 
‘illegitimate’ leaker-informer. In keeping with the template of the Drake case, Ellsberg joined a 
group of ‘teammates,’ who attempted to voice their concerns through ‘proper’ channels, prior to 
Ellsberg’s decision to leak the Pentagon Papers to the press. Additionally, as the government 
framed Drake’s leak as a crime against the body of the American soldier, Ellsberg’s leak of the 
Pentagon Papers was reconstructed as a crime against the body of the state. 206   
Ellsberg’s story is complex and spans many years; as a result, this chapter only address 
specific portions of Ellsberg’s narrative that are pertinent to the executive’s game of leaks. The 
similarities between the Drake and Ellsberg cases demonstrate that regardless of the leaker-
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informer’s motivations or intentions, she will be treated by the executive as an insider threat and 
a traitor to the government if she is an ‘illegitimate’ player in the game. 
 
War as a Well-Kept Secret 
Ellsberg had an extensive and varied perspective of the government’s back region 
performances during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations. He was a 
platoon leader in the Marines from 1954 to 1957, and in 1959, while a doctoral student in 
economics at Harvard, he started working as an analyst at the RAND Corporation, a think tank 
focused on military and defense strategy. As a scholar of decision theory, Ellsberg worked as a 
consultant to the Defense Department, and in 1962, he helped draft McNamara’s operational 
plans for nuclear war. He graduated from Harvard in 1962 and joined the Defense Department in 
1964 as a Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defense, John McNaughton. From 1965 to 
1967 he served in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. 207  
Ellsberg witnessed the contradictory front and back region ‘definitions’ of the Vietnam 
War as early as 1964 during the Gulf of Tonkin incident. While President Johnson claimed to the 
press and front region publics that he did not intend to escalate the war, Ellsberg was surprised to 
learn that his job as a Special Assistant was in fact designed to help the Johnson Administration 
prepare for a “wider war.” Ellsberg said the escalation of the Vietnam War was a “well-kept 
secret by thousands and thousands of people, including me.”208  
 Ellsberg returned to RAND in 1967 and was contracted by the Defense Department to 
work on a comprehensive review of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This study, which was 
ordered by McNamara, came to be known as the Pentagon Papers; it included some 7,000 pages 
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and covered 23 years of history, from 1945 to 1968.209 As Ellsberg and other RAND analysts had 
contributed to the report, a copy of it was kept under lock and key at the RAND offices.210  
In August and September 1969, Ellsberg read the early history of the war as detailed in 
the Pentagon Papers.211 As a result, he experienced and “awakening,”212 and changed his view of 
the American involvement in the war: 
From mid ’67 on, I had been for ending the war ‘as soon as possible,’ but I still had a 
willingness to see it prolonged by weeks or months in the course of negotiations, in hopes 
of a somewhat better solution that would leave us with a less controversial ending and 
perhaps less of a domestic backlash. But by mid-1969 I began to see that domestic 
politics couldn’t excuse it. I finally saw continuation as immoral, not just mistaken.213 
 
In addition to reading the Papers, Ellsberg relays another “awakening”214 episode in his memoir, 
Secrets. At the War Resisters’ International Conference in August 1969, Ellsberg heard a speech 
by activist Randy Kehler, who explained that he was prepared to go jail for resisting the draft. 
Kehler said to the crowd, “Right now I’m the only man left in the San Francisco WRL [War 
Resisters League] office because all the others have gone the prison already…I can look forward 
to jail, without any remorse of fear, and that’s because I know that everybody here and lots of 
people around the world like you will carry on.”215 At that point, Ellsberg said he started to sob. 
He wrote, “A line kept repeating itself in my head: We are eating our young. It was though an ex 
had split my head and my heart broke open. But what had really happened was that my life had 
split in two.”216  
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 Ellsberg describes his transformation from strategist for McNamara to antiwar advocate 
through episodic “awakenings.”217 As noted in Chapter 1, Pozen and Hess claim that that leakers 
likely “have multiple motivations or goals, some of them unconscious”218 for leaking 
information from the back region to the front. In addition to Ellsberg’s formulated awakenings, 
there are perhaps other provocations behind his decision to leak the Papers, such as egomania 
and the “greater glory of Dan,”219 or a desire to cleanse feelings of guilt for his own participation 
in furthering the war. The motivations for leaking, or claims to be acting as a whistleblower, for 
Ellsberg, Drake and others, are irrelevant to the executive; if the individual is not a ‘legitimate’ 
player in the game of leaks, she will be treated as traitor and an insider threat.  
 In September 1969, Ellsberg decided to align himself with other back region colleagues 
who shared his newfound perspective about the immorality of the war. Ellsberg said, “I went to 
some people at RAND who had been for unilateral withdrawal all along, and said, “I’m with you 
now; what shall we do about it?”220 Ellsberg and his new ‘team’ of RAND coworkers decided to 
publish a letter, which advocated unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.221 The 
letter, titled, “A Case Against Staying in Vietnam,” was published in the Washington Post and 
signed by Ellsberg, in addition to six Rand employees: Melvin Gurtov, Oleg Hoeffding, Arnold 
L. Horelick, Konrad Kellen, and Paul F. Langer.222 Ellsberg said the letter “was as controversial 
at RAND and in the Defense community probably as my leak of the Pentagon Papers was later. 
It was a bombshell among our associates…”223 Similarly, Mai Elliot, author of RAND in 
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Southeast Asia, wrote, “A strong majority [of RAND colleagues] expressed animosity toward the 
signers and were vociferous in condemning them for having violated the privileged relationship 
between RAND and the government—a relationship they viewed as akin to that between a 
lawyer and his client.”224 Through the letter, this new group of ‘teammates’ sought to inject the 
public debate with a new ‘definition of the situation.’ Additionally, they separated themselves 
from their RAND colleagues and other back region actors, who continued to support the Nixon 
Administration’s front region illustration of the war. The letter to the editor was a public act of 
refusal; the signers rejected dramaturgical cooperation with back region teammates, and a front 
region ‘definition of the situation’ that promoted the war as a success. 
While the team drafted the letter, Ellsberg began copying the Pentagon Papers in secret. 
Ellsberg received access to a Xerox machine through his friend, Tony Russo, who had been 
previously fired from RAND, possibly because of his antiwar views.225 Similar to Drake, 
Ellsberg surreptitiously refused dramaturgical cooperation by choosing to act as a leaker-
informer. Reflecting on his actions, Ellsberg said in 1973, “You see, with all the power the 
president has to contradict and retaliate against a critic, to disprove him you need a 
document.”226 For Ellsberg, the Pentagon Papers demonstrated a pattern of poor decision-making 
to which he saw no end: “Each person in that [executive] office thought his predecessors had 
made wrong decisions for stupid ideological and geopolitical reasons, whereas he was making 
the same decisions for quite different, very clever, domestic political reasons. And so, year after 
year, the war went on.”227  
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As Drake and his teammates had attempted to use ‘proper’ channels to voice their 
dissent, such as the IG reports, Ellsberg similarly attempted to express concerns to other back 
region actors. Ellsberg had given the Papers to William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, in addition to Senator George McGovern and Representative Pete 
McCloskey; he hoped the Congress would hold hearings about the war and the Papers would be 
read into the official record. In September 1970, Ellsberg even attempted to sway Henry 
Kissinger to read the Papers.228 Ellsberg, like Drake, went to the press with the Papers when he 
perceived that he had exhausted his ‘proper’ channels, and had ‘nowhere else to go.’ The press is 
a not the leaker’s first choice, but rather her last option for redress.   
 
Discretion and Retaliation 
 In a New Yorker column titled, “Daniel Ellsberg, Edward Snowden, and the Modern 
Whistle-Blower,” critic Malcolm Gladwell contrasts the credentials of Ellsberg, who studied 
with a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Harvard, to Snowden, “a community-college dropout, 
[and] a member of the murky hacking counterculture.”229 Gladwell writes that Snowden learned 
the “innermost secrets” of the N.S.A. because he was a “technician,” unlike Ellsberg, who was 
directly involved in policymaking and war planning. “Had Snowden been a whistle-blower in 
1967, at the launch of the Pentagon Papers,” writes Gladwell, “he would have blown the whistle 
on Daniel Ellsberg. The whistle-blower as insider has become the whistle-blower as outsider.”230 
Gladwell’s conception of the insider-outsider divide is too simplistic to explain the differences 
and similarities between Ellsberg and Snowden. To return to Goffman, it is clear that Snowden 
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occupied the role of service specialist who learned, “the secrets of the show and obtain[ed] a 
backstage view of it.”231 Although Snowden was not a member of elite policy makers, he was 
still nonetheless a back region actor, who had access to highly classified material. And despite 
Ellsberg’s elite credentials, he too was treated as a traitor, like Snowden and Drake. In the game 
of leaks, regardless of your educational pedigree or enmeshment in “Washington power 
culture,”232 if you are deemed an ‘illegitimate’ player by the government, you will be prosecuted 
as a traitor.  
 Ellsberg actually displayed an acute understanding of the game of leaks, and the actions 
that a leaky executive would tolerate from ‘legitimate’ players. In a 1973 interview with Rolling 
Stone, Ellsberg said: 
People who wrote memoirs – and who hoped to be employed by some future president –  
would tell all the substance of the information, but they would be careful not to disclose 
that they were directly quoting from a document. It’s not necessarily because they were 
partisans of a particular president, but there are certain things an insider doesn’t disclose 
about a president, even one from whom he has resigned. Not only can the president still 
retaliate, but if you plan to stay in the market for future executive service, you have to 
show discipline in your discretion; you have to make it quite clear that no matter what the 
provocation, there are some things you won’t tell about a boss – above all, you won’t hit 
him with documents.233 
 
In disclosing the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg disregarded the “discretion” shown by ‘legitimate’ 
players, who wished to remain employable in politics. However, as is evident in his trial, 
Ellsberg did not dispense with discretion entirely. 
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Spies and Plumbers 
In January 1973, the government charged Ellsberg with espionage, theft, and 
conspiracy.234 Ellsberg’s case is significant in American legal history, as he was the first leaker 
to be tried under the Espionage Act;235 previously, the Act had only been applied to defendants 
charged as spies. The prosecution in Ellsberg’s case attempted to paint him as a thief, whose 
actions could have aided the enemy.236 A New York Times article explained that the government 
had to prove that in leaking the Papers, the “country's national defense was injured.”237 The 
prosecution relied on the testimony of military officials and generals, one of whom made the 
claim that the release of the Papers could help the Vietcong understand U.S. war planning, and 
were thus a broad threat to national security.238 Despite these claims, Ellsberg did maintain a 
level of “discretion” in curating the Papers, as he had omitted portions of the Papers related to 
ongoing negotiations.239 Additionally, the Papers only referenced events up to March 1968, 
which by the time of Ellsberg’s disclosure to the press in 1971, made any information related to 
American military strategies out of date. 
 As Drake was charged with causing potential harm to the bodies of ‘soldiers in the field,’ 
Ellsberg was framed as instigating a broader, more amorphous harm to the body of the state. 
Although Ellsberg and Drake were not spies, by charging them under the Espionage Act, the 
government conflated the act of leaking with the crimes of spying against United States. As the 
charges against Ellsberg demonstrate, if the government is shamed by the content of the 
disclosed material, the leaker will face retaliation within and outside the bounds of the law. 
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The Ellsberg case is significant not only for the novel application of the Espionage Act, 
but also for revealing the existence of Nixon’s ‘Plumbers,’ who were created to ‘plug’ leaks 
stemming from within and outside the White House. In April 1973, prosecutors informed the 
judge presiding over Ellsberg’s trial that the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist was burglarized.240 
E. Howard Hunt, a former C.I.A. agent, had assembled a group of conspirators, known as the 
Plumber,s to obtain information from the psychiatrist’s files in order to “discredit” Ellsberg and 
his mental state.241 Egil Krogh, a Deputy Assistant to Nixon, recalled a meeting with the 
Plumbers to discuss the break-in:  
Mr. Hunt urged us to carry out a “covert operation” to get a “mother lode” of 
information…Mr. Liddy told us the F.B.I. had frequently carried out such covert 
operations — a euphemism for burglaries — in national security investigations, that he 
had even done some himself. …At no time did I or anyone else there question whether 
the operation was necessary, legal or moral. Convinced that we were responding 
legitimately to a national security crisis, we focused instead on the operational details: 
who would do what, when and where.242 
 
Although the Plumbers are generally known for the infamous break-in of the Democratic 
Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel, the first public acknowledgement of the group occurred 
during the Ellsberg trial. In addition, it was also revealed that F.B.I. had “picked up” Ellsberg on 
a wiretap in 1969 and 1970, but claimed that “all records and logs of those conversations had 
disappeared.”243 After learning about both the break-in and the wiretap, the judge said the 
government’s actions “offended a sense of justice” and “threatened the defendants' rights to a fair 
trial;” as a result, the judge declared a mistrial.244 It is not a coincidence that evidence of 
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government misconduct arose in the cases of Drake and Ellsberg. The executive viewed Drake 
and Ellsberg as ‘illegitimate’ players in the game of leaks, and as a result, engaged in illegal and 
aggressive retaliatory measures in the name of protecting the sacred bodies of the American state 
and its soldiers.  
 
Conclusion 
Ellsberg and the Nixon administration were engaged in a series of patterned responses, 
which were initially provoked by contradictory front and back region performances of the 
Vietnam War. Ellsberg’s evolution into a leaker-informer mirrored Drake’s behavior, which 
included joining a group of ‘teammates’ who attempted to voice their concerns through ‘proper’ 
channels. Whether Ellsberg’s disclosures to the press were motivated by a desire to end a war or 
feed an ego are irrelevant; he was an ‘illegitimate’ player in the game of leaks and thus subject to 
the aggressive retaliation from a shamed executive.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 On April 13, 2018, Donald Trump tweeted, “DOJ just issued the McCabe report - which 
is a total disaster. He LIED! LIED! LIED! McCabe was totally controlled by Comey - McCabe 
is Comey!! No collusion, all made up by this den of thieves and lowlifes!”245 In this tweet, 
Trump references Andrew McCabe, a former Deputy Director of the F.B.I., who worked under 
James Comey, the former Director of the F.B.I. It is unknown if Trump is calling the “DOJ” or 
the “McCabe report” a “total disaster,” but his tweet is clearly a response to the public release of 
an IG report concerning McCabe’s alleged leak to a Wall Street Journal reporter. The leak in 
question appeared in an October 31, 2016 article titled, “FBI in Internal Feud Over Hillary 
Clinton Probe.” The article concerned the F.B.I.’s reexamination of misconduct by the Clinton 
Foundation and was published just a few days before the election.246 The IG report concludes 
that McCabe engaged in misconduct when he leaked “sensitive information”247 and that McCabe 
“lacked candor”248 during the F.B.I.’s investigation of the leak. Stewart Baker, a former general 
counsel of the National Security Agency and blogger, offered a summary the McCabe’s affair: 
McCabe leaked dirt on the Justice Department, then misled FBI Director James Comey 
about the source of the leak, then misled leak investigators over and over again. It’s hard 
to read the report and feel that McCabe’s firing wasn’t earned. And yet, for all that, 
there’s a bit of low tragedy in McCabe’s tale. For he was disgraced not because he was 
evil, but because events conspired to turn his talent for regular old government 
information management into a fatal flaw.249  
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I am not sure if McCabe has a particular “talent” for leaking. Rather, if we return to Pozen’s 
terminology, McCabe was a well-situated pleaker in the scheme of “regular old government 
information management,” i.e. the game of leaks.  
As discussed earlier, pleakers help to maintain the “legal and bureaucratic fog”250 
surrounding leaks, which serves as a long-term benefit for the executive. McCabe’s case is 
vaguely reminiscent of Scooter Libby’s. While Libby worked in the Vice President’s office, and 
McCabe in the F.B.I, both officials would be considered ‘legitimate’ players in the game of 
leaks. In 2007, Libby was prosecuted for leaking the name of a C.I.A. agent; he was convicted of 
obstructing justice, lying under oath, and making false statements.251 About 11 years later, and 
within days of tweeting about the IG report on McCabe, Trump pardoned Libby for all of his 
crimes.252 McCabe’s case has been referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for criminal 
prosecution; if convicted, McCabe could be prosecuted for offenses nearly identical to 
Libby’s.253  
While the pleaker’s enmeshment in “Washington power culture”254 often acts as a 
deterrent for prosecution, we can see in Libby and McCabe’s cases that the boundaries 
surrounding ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ leakers are not fixed. Rather, what separates 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ actors are changeable social norms, which are currently subject to 
the whims of a flexible “Washington power culture”255 and an unpredictable executive. 
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In “The Leaky Leviathan,” Pozen writes “Because there are so few leak prosecutions, 
those that are brought can send powerful signals throughout government about the parameters of 
permissible leaking.” He continues:  
The sample size is too small, and the recent cases (several of which are ongoing) too 
fresh, to distill neat lessons. But the general pattern suggests that the most vulnerable 
officials are those lone wolves who speak with reporters outside the context of any active 
interagency process — true leakers, not pleakers or planters, in this Article’s typology — 
and whose claim to a whistleblowing purpose is complicated by evidence of dubious 
tactics or dishonorable aims.256  
 
Although this paper may lack a distillation of “neat lessons” about leak prosecutions, I have 
offered a template which illuminates how the “true leaker” and government engage in a series of 
patterned responses. As is evident in the cases of Drake and Ellsberg, an administration’s 
contradictory front and back region “definitions of the situation”257 serve as the initial motivation 
for a back region government employee to evolve into a leaker-informer. In contrast to Pozen’s 
claim that these leaker-informers are “lone wolves,”258 I have demonstrated that they actually 
part of a ‘team’ of dissenters. Drake worked with Binney, Wiebe, Loomis, and Roark to file 
confidential complaints with the IGs at both the N.S.A. and Department of Defense. When these 
‘proper’ channels failed to address the team’s concerns, Drake surreptitiously refused 
dramaturgical cooperation and began leaking documents to a reporter. Similarly, Ellsberg formed 
a ‘team’ of colleagues at RAND who made a public appeal for unilateral withdrawal from 
Vietnam. Ellsberg also attempted to convince other back region actors, including elected 
representatives, to read the Pentagon Papers and hold public hearings on the administration’s 
contradictory claims about the progress of the Vietnam War. Both Drake and Ellsberg turned to 
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the press as a last resort; after the ‘proper’ channels had failed them, they hoped the media would 
use their curated leak to inject the front region debate with a new ‘definition of the situation.’  
 In my examination of the Drake and Ellberg cases, we can also dispute Pozen’s claim that 
the “most vulnerable officials” are those “whose claim to a whistleblowing purpose is 
complicated by evidence of dubious tactics or dishonorable aims.”259 As discussed earlier, 
Ellsberg may have been motivated by a sincere desire to end the war, or feed an insatiable ego. 
Although Drake did not engage in “dubious tactics or dishonorable aims,” and only leaked 
information regarded to fraud and abuse, one could make an argument that he was perhaps a 
vengeful bureaucrat, or possessed a savior complex. I demonstrate that if the content of the leak 
brings shame to the executive, or threatens the American war project, the ‘illegitimate’ leaker 
will be targeted for retaliation and prosecution regardless of her moral or legal claims to be a 
whistleblower. Although I have only examined two cases in this paper, I believe that it is likely 
that an embarrassed executive will retaliate against a ‘illegitimate’ leaker whether or not she 
possessed “dubious tactics or dishonorable aims.”  
The Drake and Ellsberg cases also prove that the government will use aggressive and 
sometimes illegal measures to retaliate against ‘illegitimate’ leaker-informers. John Crane, a 
former Assistant Inspector General at Department of Defense, claims that the IG illegally 
unmasked Drake and his teammates’ identities and passed them to the F.B.I. Additionally, the 
IG’s files were suspiciously destroyed in conflict with the government’s information retention 
policies.260 The illegal tactics used against Ellsberg were even more egregious. Nixon’s infamous 
Plumbers broke into Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office in an effort to find and publicize 
compromising material. The F.B.I. also claimed that wiretap records of Ellsberg had inexplicably 
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“disappeared.”261 It is evident that ‘illegitimate’ leaker-informers will be subjected to aggressive 
retaliation within and outside the confines of the law. 
 Drake and Ellsberg were both charged under the Espionage Act even though neither of 
them was accused of spying on behalf of a foreign power. Rather, the executive sought to 
conflate the leaker-informer’s disclosures with the crime of espionage. Similarly, the executive 
attempted to frame the offense of leaking into a crime against the sacred bodies of the American 
soldier and the state. As Drake was accused of potentially causing harm to ‘soldiers in the field,’ 
Ellsberg was accused of violating the body of the state.  
 Although the details will vary, I believe the patterned responses of the executive to 
information disclosures by ‘illegitimate’ leaker-informers will generally conform to the plotlines 
I unearthed in the cases of Drake and Ellsberg. While additional research is certainly needed, I 
believe that in the coming years, there will be a significant uptick in the number of prosecutions 
of both ‘illegitimate’ and ‘legitimate’ leaker-informers, who will be charged under the Espionage 
Act and charged with endangering the sacred bodies of the and American soldiers forever ‘in the 
field.’ 
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